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Abstract: Cyber Defence Exercises (CDX) are common training and learning tools. A
recently discussed challenge in cyber defence teaching and training is the gap between the fast
technological advancement accompanied by rapidly changing demands on future cyber defence
operators, and the lack of science-based teaching and training methods.
A growing body of evidence suggests a crucial role of human factors as a central predictor
for human performance in sociotechnical systems. While this has been acknowledged in a wide
range of safety-critical applied fields, there is still a lack of knowledge about the impact of
human factors on cyber defence performance. The lack of conventional metrics of performance
and learning progress contribute to this deficit.
To address this gap, the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy (NDCA) follows a science-based
educational approach that identified in a series of empirical studies cognitive-psychological
predictors for learning success of future cyber defence operators. These predictors and elements
of a human factors research program are deeply embedded into educational practice and include
processes such as metacognition, self-regulation, coping, communication and shared mental
modelling. Slow education methods and mentoring are fundamental to enabling the advancement
of human factors cognisance among military cyber cadets.
As a tool for efficient training, the NDCA developed and implemented a mentoring concept that
involves a cyber defence retrospective timeline analysis involving expert and practitioner level
mentors. The timeline differentiates between performance relevant hard- and soft-skills and leads
progressively towards an alignment of Security Operation Centre (SOC)- and expert judgments
of performance. The NDCA argues that this educational concept facilitates educational benefits
based on insight, accurate self-perception, motivation and decreased team workloads following
more efficient collaboration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The performance of human agents in socio-technical sys-
tems such as cyber defence settings is co-determined by
human factors (Gutzwiller et al. 2015). The positive or
detrimental effects human factors can have on performance
outcomes in these socio-technical systems depends to a
large degree on the level of expertise, both on individual
and team level. It is therefore of utmost importance to
raise awareness amongst future experts and include hu-
man factor teaching already at the early stages of cyber
defence education. This article proposes the educational
model applied at the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy
(NDCA) in which expert mentoring is embedded into a
slow education concept. We argue for the inclusion of
human factor research in training of cyber officer cadets
and the implementation of a mentoring concept focussing
on hard and soft skill development directly linked to Cyber
Defence Exercises.
1.1 Education in Human Factors
The rapid emergence of cyber security and cyber defence
as a field of study and practice has lead to a mismatch
between evidence-based teaching and training methods
of future cyber operators on one side, and the rapidly
progressing skill requirements for effective and adaptive
performance on the other (Hoffman 2014, Upton & Creese
2014). A clear educational and scientific focus is required
to ensure cyber operators develop the necessary technical
competencies, as well as the mental skills that have the
capacity to avoid the natural inclination towards cog-
nitive rigidity and instead promote cognitive flexibility
(Feltovich, Spierer & Coulson 1997, Klein & Baxter 2006).
Achieving success in the face of adversaries who have
developed tactics, techniques and procedures over decades
in live and simulated environments (Antal 2018) requires
defence forces adapt tactics, leadership models, and cyber-
team training techniques to address power imbalances.
When an adversary is capable of operating below the
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threshold of war, able to employ tactics that we may
yet not be aware of or able to see, may wish to appear
clumsy, counterproductive, obvious and easily debunked
(Giles 2016), then cyber defence teams should be trained
and adaptable enough to not be influenced by knowledge
obfuscation or reflexive control (Thomas 2011). To do this
may require Complexity Preservation in training. This re-
quires learners to practice in varied contexts at boundaries
of current knowledge and skills, accessing knowledge when
it is useful or needed, anticipatory thinking, and consider
the implications of the current situation for the future,
and the alternative ways in which situations may evolve,
updating and re-configuring understanding on-the-fly and
constantly, and juggling priorities and goal-conflict resolu-
tion (Ward et al. 2018). Building utility and resilience in
cyber defence teams to ensure mission assurance, means
establishing a holistic framework for performance mea-
surement in cyber range environments. Education meth-
ods that rely on concepts of learning to store, share and
retrieve knowledge are no longer sufficient. Neither is re-
liance on attending a finite number of scheduled exercises
per year sufficient to be classified an expert, or a high
performing cyber-team.
The attempt to identify human factor variables predic-
tive for performance and accelerated learning that can
be developed early in the cyber defence education pro-
cess are vital components to ensure mitigating defenders
fixed-action patterns; such as negative affect in the form
of rumination focussed on internal emotional processes
(Nolen-Hoeksema 1991). Failure to address this will only
weaken the strongest link in cyber defence, allowing an
adversary to exercise cyber power and exploit fixed-action
patterns by triggering such behavioural features, leading
defenders to be exploited to the point where they misinter-
pret and/or worse over-react to a cyber-attack. Defenders
may also make decisions based upon logic misconceptions,
cognitive biases or emotional influences, or rely uncon-
sciously too heavily on intuitive decision-making strategies
(Lugo et al. 2016). Institutions need cyber defenders with
adaptive and resilient cognitive regulatory strategies. For
example, defenders need to be able to measure and monitor
their own performance relative to their actual performance
or learning rate. This practice is needed to extend cur-
rent knowledge, whilst facilitating the acquisition of new
knowledge and reasoning competencies, at the edge of their
current cognisance (Ward et al. 2018).
1.2 The role of mentoring for metacognition and motivation
The term human factors encompasses a variety of human
characteristics, abilities, and behavioural traits. A factor
with known importance for learning progress is the indi-
viduals insight into its own cognitive processes, a prereq-
uisite for goal-directed improvements or compensations.
A substantial body of research supports the predictive
power of metacognition for academic performance (Young
& Fry 2008) as well as in cyber defence scenarios (Knox
et al. 2018). Metacognition is defined as awareness of
ones own knowledge - what one does and does not know
- and ones ability to understand, control, and manip-
ulate ones cognitive processes (Meichenbaum 1985). In
practice, metacognition means awareness of and exerting
control over ones thinking in planning, monitoring, and
evaluating ones cognitions, emotions and behaviors, and
actively adapting to the situational demands. In addition
to the persons knowledge and awareness of own skills (e.g.
self-efficacy), beliefs (confidence), and expected outcomes
(situational knowledge), metacognitive knowledge such as
technical and experiential knowledge are vital to improve
performance. Metacognition develops when the learner,
alongside the expert mentor, monitors, debugs, and evalu-
ates what is learned (Nietfeld & Schraw 2002). Reflecting
upon how cognitions affect behavior is also essential for
metacognitive development. One key process to facilitate
metacognitive skills is the reception of precise feedback
from mentors and/or peers. Besides facilitating metacog-
nitive accuracy, mentoring and expert-mentors feedback
has also the potential to increase motivation and thus
the effort an individual invests into a challenging (diffi-
cult and/or tiring) task when maneuvering in a complex
socio-technical system. The motivation to invest effort has
been found to be a significant predictor for cyber defence
team performances (Helkala et al. 2016), provided there
is a substantial level of domain knowledge in place. Evi-
dence from pedagogical research indicates a clear associa-
tion between expert mentoring and academic performance
(Rhodes 2008), self-regulatory skills (Wentzel 2019), sat-
isfaction levels, and lower stress and anxiety levels (Crips
& Cruz 2009).
1.3 Retrospective verbal reports as an educational tool in
CDX
An efficient tool to realize mentoring in a CDX context
and to tap into the resources experts can offer for the
cyber defence education, are retrospective verbal reports
(RVR). In more general contexts, RVR have been shown
to differentiate between experts and novices and are used
to extract covert cognitive processes. RVRs provide ex-
plicit descriptions of chosen problem-solving strategies and
can be facilitated through cuing. RVR access both short-
term memory systems, through episodic descriptions, and
long-term memory systems, such as goals, procedures and
strategies (Taylor & Dionne 2000). RVRs are used to
capture expert performance strategies, operationalize and
integrate these approaches into testable paradigms, and
accelerate learning by training novices on identified factors
from expert reports. This approach has been proven to
facilitate performance in nursing (Ericsson & Ward 2007),
sports (Meichenbaum 1985) and in military domains (Hoff-
man et al. 2014). The NDCA educational concept uses
RVR techniques in a structured mentoring scheme applied
on cyber cadets.
2. EDUCATIONAL APPROACH IN THE
NORWEGIAN DEFENCE CYBER ACADEMY
At the NDCA the Bachelor in Technology is grounded in
a philosophy of mentorship from selection to graduation.
The NDCA feeds officers and non-commissioned officers to
all defence services. With the right mental competencies,
cyber cadets can adapt rapidly after graduation to their
chosen operating environment and perform. Mentoring can
scaffold cyber hard skills and human soft skills. At the
NDCA these two features are constantly combined and
tested in order to ensure holistic performance enhance-
ment at individual and cyber-team level. The approach
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the NDCA takes to educating military cyber cadets is
built upon traditional military methods, combined with
methods that are founded in cognitive engineering and
techniques known to accelerate learning (Hoffman 2014)
where interventions are made in an attempt to develop
adaptive skills. In their final six months cadets specialize
in the areas of network establishment and maintenance
or defensive cyberspace operations. The NDCA aims to
shape individuals capable of governing cyber power effects
in military cyberspace operations following a personal
development approach. This centres on certain cognitive
skills known to support professional performance, such as
metacognition, coping strategies (Helkala et al. 2016) self-
regulatory processes (Bandura 1986; Bohlmann & Downer
2016), and communication (Knox et al. 2018).
2.1 Slow Education
The approach the NDCA takes to presenting human factor
skills to cyber cadets is through slow education methods
(Knox et al. 2019). Slow education is an adaptive non-
standard based approach to education, and mentoring is a
central concept in the slow education strategy. Mentors
can support how learners consolidate experiences and
new knowledge to long-term memory through for example
reflection (Halpern 1998).
The present article argues for the beneficial effects of
mentoring on individual and cyber-team performance.
The mentoring scheme is implemented during the annual
capstone CDX held at the NDCA. The CDX has a research
based methodology designed to improve both personal and
professional development aspects. The mentor function
model (Figure 1) allows for cadets to engage in deliberate
practice (Ericsson et al. 1993) and deliberate performance
(Fadde & Klein 2010) in a safe-to-fail environment. Like
most military exercises, key to achieving the CDX goals is
an After Action Review (AAR) process. AARs are defined
as a guided analysis of an organizations performance to
be conducted during and at the conclusion of an event for
future improvement (US Army 2014). The daily AAR at
the NDCA CDX allows the cadet run Security Operation
Centres (SOC) the opportunity to: question, interpret
and understand Red Team threat modelling and attack
methods, and cross-learn between SOCs in an open and
safe setting. The Scenario Team, Green Team, Red Team
and Mentor Teams all have an active role in helping the
learners calibrate their own understanding. The crux of
this AAR session is to develop the cadets understand
function (Ministry of Defence 2015) and overall domain
cognisance.
The purpose of the retrospective-timeline construction
(Figure 1) is to generate observable events, the main ac-
tions that were taken, and key mental events that were
important to them. The timeline intends to capture their
cognition in context and aims to include key moments they
noticed, that caught their attention, that they understood,
or when their understanding changed, decisions or judge-
ments they made, or gut feelings experienced, moments of
being unsure as to what was going on, actions taken or not
taken (but considered), key moments where they had to
just trust, or not trust, times when they had to seek or give
input to others, and moments of significant communication
(including things that were not said, that in hindsight,
needed saying) intended to build self-efficacy, domain un-
derstanding, cyber-team performance and where possible;
accelerate learning.
A key daily task for the expert mentor and the cadets is
to construct three timelines (see Figure 1). Timelines and
Retrospective-Timelines were constructed in sequence:
• Mentor Timeline: This is a continuous process that
involved the expert mentor populating his own time-
line with observations. This timeline can be thought
of as a kind of truth line. The expert mentor has
oversight on the exercise events matrix, giving full
insight to Red Team activities, as well as other sched-
uled scenario injects. The expert mentor observes
for hard and soft skills, noting events, or non-events
throughout each day.
• Cadet Retrospective-Timeline 1 (RT1): At the end
of each day, prior to entering the AAR each SOC
uses 30 minutes to reflect on the days events and plot
them on a timeline. Cadets were instructed to take
a retrospective account of moments where hard skills
and soft skills were required/arose that either aided,
abetted or hindered individual or team performance.
The purpose is to encourage reflection and attention
to performance factors. As well as an attempt to
trigger attention and focus to avoid the inevitable
mental switch-off/slow down as the daily scenario
ends.
• Retrospective-Timeline 2 (RT2): Once the AAR is
complete, cadets return to their SOC and together
with their mentor constructed a second retrospective-
timeline. The purpose of RT2 is to as far as possible
according to their now deeper understanding of the
days events connect cognition to context based on
learning manifest. This active reflection process is led
by the expert mentor who is able to use his truth-
line as reference. On completion of RT2 the cadets
should have greater clarity and cognisance relating to
actions, interactions and decision-making.
In addition to an expert mentor, each SOC had a prac-
titioner level mentor. Ideally, this person is closer in age
and experience to the cadets than to the expert. The prac-
titioner mentors role and function is more peer support,
providing a cognitive and context bridge between expert
and novice. The practitioner mentor supports populating
the expert mentor timeline.
The allocation of mentors to each SOC during the CDX is
as follows:
• SOC 1: Two experienced cyber defence practitioner
level mentors (one on the cusp of meeting expert cri-
teria). Both were Non Commissioned Officers (NCO)
and neither had previous experience or training in
retrospective-timeline activity.
• SOC 2: One military officer expert mentor and one
practitioner level NCO. Neither had experience or
training in retrospective-timeline activity.
• SOC 3: One civilian expert mentor plus an NCO
practitioner. Neither had experience or training in
retrospectivetimeline activity.
2019 IFAC HMS
Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 16-19, 2019
165
166 Benjamin J. Knox  et al. / IFAC PapersOnLine 52-19 (2019) 163–168
• SOC 4: One military officer expert mentor with train-
ing and experience in retrospective-timeline activity,
plus a civilian practitioner with no experience or
training in retrospective-timeline activity.
At the NDCA an expert is objectively defined as an in-
dividual with over fifteen years experience in the field of
cyber security, information technology, information secu-
rity. This individual will also have as a minimum a Masters
with multiple additional field related qualifications. Ideally
the expert will have a PhD and practical experience of
conducting cyber-military operations. A practitioner level
mentor may have 5+ years experience, and with a number
of additional cyber related courses added to her CV.
3. EFFECTS AND EXPERIENCES
When conducting training on cyber ranges it is critical to
establish the baseline domain cognisance of participants to
ensure task and case balancing (Kick 2014). Establishing
in advance areas that may affect performance is crucial
with regards to training efficiency. Scoring high in capture
the flag training scenarios reveals limited information as
a holistic measure of performance as they tend not to
give indicators of a robust and cognitively resilient cyber-
team. If a cyber range scenario is out of the cognisance
space of a member(s) of the training audience then there
is the inevitable risk that team member(s) will struggle to
cope and become a burden on the team. This situation is
detrimental for the individual and group efficacy. As well
as novices and all other levels of cyber operators, non-
technical personnel in key positions in organisations - who
are not immune for cyber-fire - should themselves take
an active part in cyber defence training. These leaders
are often the high value targets for adversaries as they
lack necessary cyber cognisance. Consequently, training
on a cyber range with team members who have more
domain knowledge, will require that the range and the
team members have the capacity to accommodate those
with less. Importantly also, umpires, mentors and expert
facilitators need to understand human factors, as well as
having expertise in hard tech skills, if they are measuring
and supporting individual and team performance.
Further research is needed to develop the necessary criteria
to ensure expert mentor(s) have the required skill set to
support holistic skill development. Technical knowledge
consistent with the domain of operations is a prerequisite.
Although many systems and their architectures are alike,
the context in which cyber defence occurs and how inci-
dents are handled will vary according to individual sector
(business) objectives. Combined with this knowledge, the
expert mentor should be proficient in the domain of human
factors. For many experts in cyber defence, cognisance
relating to human factors for adaptive performance is an
unfamiliar field and represents a domain of uncertainty.
An outstanding challenge for future work is to put experts
through a similar process as conducted in the CDX for cy-
ber cadets. In addition to retrospective-timeline analysis,
a Cognitive Task Analysis could also be extremely useful
tool to reveal expert mental processes (Crandall 2006) that
can be fed back into novice and practitioner level training
packages.
Future collaborative research should also include how to
integrate cyber doctrine, military strategy and cyber tac-
tics into the education at NDCA. Cyber cadets need to
know how to identify, synthesize and respond to hostile
cyberpower effects. This means an organisational shift
from reactive, linear, information assurance approaches to
methods that provide mission assurance and are founded
on operational objectives and the reality that cyberspace
and the cyber domain is a battlefield that needs defending.
To do this requires comprehensive domain cognisance, be-
yond tech savvy. The large proportion of cyber cadets are
highly intelligent. At the NDCA, forty cadets are selected
each year from over 300 applicants, all of whom have
highly competitive STEM backgrounds. With this aca-
demic baseline, the opportunity for complexity preserva-
tion by scaffolding new knowledge is possible. The NDCA
makes cadets study strategy and doctrine as early as their
first semester. When it pertains to the cyber domain, the
argument often presented in military circles of too much
too soon is challenged as our adversaries will be targeting
our weak points, and its the cadets who are the governors
of tactical, operational and strategic level digital ecosys-
tems. The NDCA therefore starts building an education
platform around new thinking that pertains to advanced
understanding, planning, and cooperation that leads to
a place where the cyber operators can govern military
operations in the one domain where characteristics and
features are constantly evolving.
4. FUTURE WORK
A next step for the NDCA is to build on earlier slow
education approaches [34]. The intent is to further en-
courage deeper mental processes in the form of improved
cadet situational metacognitive judgements (SMJ). This
can be achieved by asking them to rate the three areas
judgement of own performance, confidence, and effort. The
recommended methodology for this would be cadets an-
swer short questionnaires at key times during the day. For
this purpose the Task Workload Scale should be omitted
due to the scales focus on personal (individual) demands,
but the Teamwork and Task-Team component should be
included.
4.1 Pre-mission questions
• How well do you think you will do?
• How sure are you about this judgment?
• How confident are you right now?
• How much effort will this need to do well? (Continu-
ous assessment of increasing/decreasing amounts.)
• How well will your team do?
• How sure are you about this?
4.2 Post-mission and post-RT1 questions:
• How well did you think you did?
• How sure are you about this judgment?
• How confident were you during the exercise?
• How much effort did you put in through the exercise?
(Continuous assessment of incr./decr. amounts.)
• How well did your team do?
• How sure are you about this?
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• SOC 4: One military officer expert mentor with train-
ing and experience in retrospective-timeline activity,
plus a civilian practitioner with no experience or
training in retrospective-timeline activity.
At the NDCA an expert is objectively defined as an in-
dividual with over fifteen years experience in the field of
cyber security, information technology, information secu-
rity. This individual will also have as a minimum a Masters
with multiple additional field related qualifications. Ideally
the expert will have a PhD and practical experience of
conducting cyber-military operations. A practitioner level
mentor may have 5+ years experience, and with a number
of additional cyber related courses added to her CV.
3. EFFECTS AND EXPERIENCES
When conducting training on cyber ranges it is critical to
establish the baseline domain cognisance of participants to
ensure task and case balancing (Kick 2014). Establishing
in advance areas that may affect performance is crucial
with regards to training efficiency. Scoring high in capture
the flag training scenarios reveals limited information as
a holistic measure of performance as they tend not to
give indicators of a robust and cognitively resilient cyber-
team. If a cyber range scenario is out of the cognisance
space of a member(s) of the training audience then there
is the inevitable risk that team member(s) will struggle to
cope and become a burden on the team. This situation is
detrimental for the individual and group efficacy. As well
as novices and all other levels of cyber operators, non-
technical personnel in key positions in organisations - who
are not immune for cyber-fire - should themselves take
an active part in cyber defence training. These leaders
are often the high value targets for adversaries as they
lack necessary cyber cognisance. Consequently, training
on a cyber range with team members who have more
domain knowledge, will require that the range and the
team members have the capacity to accommodate those
with less. Importantly also, umpires, mentors and expert
facilitators need to understand human factors, as well as
having expertise in hard tech skills, if they are measuring
and supporting individual and team performance.
Further research is needed to develop the necessary criteria
to ensure expert mentor(s) have the required skill set to
support holistic skill development. Technical knowledge
consistent with the domain of operations is a prerequisite.
Although many systems and their architectures are alike,
the context in which cyber defence occurs and how inci-
dents are handled will vary according to individual sector
(business) objectives. Combined with this knowledge, the
expert mentor should be proficient in the domain of human
factors. For many experts in cyber defence, cognisance
relating to human factors for adaptive performance is an
unfamiliar field and represents a domain of uncertainty.
An outstanding challenge for future work is to put experts
through a similar process as conducted in the CDX for cy-
ber cadets. In addition to retrospective-timeline analysis,
a Cognitive Task Analysis could also be extremely useful
tool to reveal expert mental processes (Crandall 2006) that
can be fed back into novice and practitioner level training
packages.
Future collaborative research should also include how to
integrate cyber doctrine, military strategy and cyber tac-
tics into the education at NDCA. Cyber cadets need to
know how to identify, synthesize and respond to hostile
cyberpower effects. This means an organisational shift
from reactive, linear, information assurance approaches to
methods that provide mission assurance and are founded
on operational objectives and the reality that cyberspace
and the cyber domain is a battlefield that needs defending.
To do this requires comprehensive domain cognisance, be-
yond tech savvy. The large proportion of cyber cadets are
highly intelligent. At the NDCA, forty cadets are selected
each year from over 300 applicants, all of whom have
highly competitive STEM backgrounds. With this aca-
demic baseline, the opportunity for complexity preserva-
tion by scaffolding new knowledge is possible. The NDCA
makes cadets study strategy and doctrine as early as their
first semester. When it pertains to the cyber domain, the
argument often presented in military circles of too much
too soon is challenged as our adversaries will be targeting
our weak points, and its the cadets who are the governors
of tactical, operational and strategic level digital ecosys-
tems. The NDCA therefore starts building an education
platform around new thinking that pertains to advanced
understanding, planning, and cooperation that leads to
a place where the cyber operators can govern military
operations in the one domain where characteristics and
features are constantly evolving.
4. FUTURE WORK
A next step for the NDCA is to build on earlier slow
education approaches [34]. The intent is to further en-
courage deeper mental processes in the form of improved
cadet situational metacognitive judgements (SMJ). This
can be achieved by asking them to rate the three areas
judgement of own performance, confidence, and effort. The
recommended methodology for this would be cadets an-
swer short questionnaires at key times during the day. For
this purpose the Task Workload Scale should be omitted
due to the scales focus on personal (individual) demands,
but the Teamwork and Task-Team component should be
included.
4.1 Pre-mission questions
• How well do you think you will do?
• How sure are you about this judgment?
• How confident are you right now?
• How much effort will this need to do well? (Continu-
ous assessment of increasing/decreasing amounts.)
• How well will your team do?
• How sure are you about this?
4.2 Post-mission and post-RT1 questions:
• How well did you think you did?
• How sure are you about this judgment?
• How confident were you during the exercise?
• How much effort did you put in through the exercise?
(Continuous assessment of incr./decr. amounts.)
• How well did your team do?
• How sure are you about this?
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Fig. 1. Mentor concept as implemented in the annual capstone CDX. Three timelines are produced each day in each
SOC in accordance with the days cyber related events. This process should enable the cadets to identify realistic
and achievable goals for improved performance for the next day.
4.3 Post-RT2 questions:
• Having completed RT2, how well did you actually do
today?
• How sure are you about this judgment?
• Having completed RT2, how confident are you now
about tomorrow?
• Having completed RT2, how much effort would you
have actually needed to use to get closer to the expert
level? (Less, same, more, alot more)
• Having completed RT2, how well did your team
actually do today?
The outcome for cadets completing this intervention is
improved critical self reflection for more accurate measure-
ment and monitoring of own and cyber-team performance
relative to actual performance or learning rate (Ward et
al. 2018). This, in combination with the retrospective-
timeline analysis means the XDCA encourages adaptive
performance by facilitating metacognitive skills and reflec-
tive practice immediately prior to, midst and on comple-
tion of work (Fadde & Klein 2010).
5. CONCLUSION
This critical appraisal contributes to highlighting the ob-
vious need to include findings of human factors research
into cyber defence education and training. Currently these
key components of developing competent cyber operators
do not meet a sufficient knowledge base, and warrant
systematic educational approaches starting from an early
phase in the educational process.
Through the inclusion of scientifically validated concepts
that benefit insight, accurate self-perception, motivation
and decreased team workload, the NDCA is able to pre-
serve complexity during protracted periods of training for
novice level cyber operators. Applying a rigorous expert
mentoring model, that is built into the design and archi-
tecture of a capstone cyber defence exercise, allows the
NDCA to develop cadets understand function as well as
their wider domain cognisance.
It remains to be established if the NDCA mentor concept
aligns with earlier research that indicates associations
between expert mentoring and academic performance.
In 2019 the researchers will aim to validate the mentor
model by investigating motivation, satisfaction, stress and
anxiety levels during the CDX.
6. REFERENCES
Antal, J 2018, No Train, No Gain. How the US Army’s
National Training Center is Preparing for High-Intensity
War, Military Technology, vol. 12, no. 12, pp. 4.
Bandura, A 1986, Social foundations of thought and ac-
tion: A social cognitive theory, Prentice Hall, Inc., Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ.
2019 IFAC HMS
Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 16-19, 2019
167
168 Benjamin J. Knox  et al. / IFAC PapersOnLine 52-19 (2019) 163–168
Bohlmann, N & Downer, J 2016, Self-regulation and
task engagement as predictors of emergent language and
literacy skills, Early Education and Development, vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 18-37.
Crandall, B, Klein, G, Klein, G, & Hoffman, R 2006,
Working minds: A practitioner’s guide to cognitive task
analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Crisp, G & Cruz, I 2009, Mentoring college students: A
critical review of the literature between 1990 and 2007,
Research in Higher Education, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 525-545.
Ericsson, K & Ward, P 2007, Capturing the naturally oc-
curring superior performance of experts in the laboratory:
Toward a science of expert and exceptional performance,
Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 16, no. 6,
pp. 346-350.
Ericsson, K, Krampe, R, & Tesch-Roemer, C 1993, The
role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert
performance, Psychological Review, vol. 100, pp. 363-406.
Fadde, P & Klein, G 2010, Deliberate performance: Ac-
celerating expertise in natural settings, Performance Im-
provement, vol. 49, no. 9, pp. 5-14.
Feltovich, P, Spiro, R, & Coulson, R 1997, Expertise in
context: Human and machine, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Giles, K 2016 Russias new tools for confronting the west:
continuity and innovation in Moscows exercise of power,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.
Gutzwiller, RS, Fugate, S, Sawyer, BD & Hancock, PA
2015, The human factors of cyber network defense. Pro-
ceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
Annual Meeting, vol. 59, no. 1, Sage CA: Los Angeles,
CA, pp. 322-326.
Halpern, D 1998, Teaching critical thinking for transfer
across domains: Disposition, skills, structure training, and
metacognitive monitoring, American Psychologist, vol. 53,
no. 4, pp. 449-455.
Helkala, K, Knox, BJ, Jsok , Knox S, & Lund, M 2016,
Factors to Affect Improvement in Cyber Officer Perfor-
mance, Information and Computer Security, vol. 24, no.
2.
Hoffman, RR, Ward, P, Feltovich, PJ, DiBello, L, Fiore,
SM, & Andrews, D 2014, Accelerated expertise: Training
for high proficiency in a complex world. Psychology Press,
New York.
Kick, J 2014, Cyber Exercise Playbook (No. MP140714),
MITRE Corporation, Bedford.
Klein G, & Baxter, H 2006, Cognitive transformation
theory: Contrasting cognitive and behavioral learning, In-
terservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education
Conference (I/ITSEC 2006): Training the 21st Century 4-
7 December 2006, Orlando, Florida, USA.
Knox, BJ, Josok, O, Helkala, K, Khooshabeh, P, Ode-
gaard, T, Lugo, RG, & Su¨tterlin, S 2018, Socio-technical
communication: The hybrid space and the OLB model for
science-based cyber education, Military Psychology, vol.
30, no. 4, pp. 350-359.
Knox, BJ, Lugo, RG, Helkala, K, & Su¨tterlin, S 2019,
Slow education and cognitive agility: Improving military
cyber cadet cognitive performance for better governance of
cyberpower, International Journal of Cyber Warfare and
Terrorism, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 48-66.
Lugo, RG, Su¨tterlin, S, Knox, BJ, Jsok, , Helkala, K, &
Lande, N 2016, The moderating influence of self-efficacy on
interoceptive ability and counterintuitive decision making
in officer cadets, Journal of Military Studies, vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 44-52.
Meichenbaum, D 1985, Metacognitive methods of instruc-
tion: Current status and future prospects, Special Services
in the Schools, vol. 3, no. 1-2, pp. 23-32.
Nietfeld, J & Schraw, G 2002, The effect of knowledge and
strategy training on monitoring accuracy, The Journal of
Educational Research, vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 131-142.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S 1991, Responses to depression and
their effects on the duration of depressive episodes, Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 569-582.
Rhodes, J 2008, Improving youth mentoring interven-
tions through research-based practice, American Journal
of Community Psychology, vol. 41, no. 1-2, pp. 35-42.
Sellers, J, Helton, W, Nswall, K, Funke,G & Knott,
B 2014 Development of the team workload question-
naire (TWLQ), Proceedings of the human factors and
ergonomics society annual meeting, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 989-
993, SAGE Publications, pp.989-993.
Taylor, K & Dionne, J 2000, Accessing problem-solving
strategy knowledge: The complementary use of concurrent
verbal protocols and retrospective debriefing, Journal of
Educational Psychology, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 413-425.
Thomas, T 2011, Recasting the red star: Russia forges tra-
dition and technology through toughness, Foreign Military
Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
Upton, S & Creese, S 2014, The danger from within,
Harvard Business Review, vol. 92, no. 9, pp. 94-101.
US Army FM 6-0 2014, Commander and Staff Or-
ganisation and Operations, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.milsci.ucsb.edu. [Accessed: 28- Feb- 2019].
Ward, P & Williams, A 2003, Perceptual and cognitive
skill development in soccer: The multidimensional nature
of expert performance, Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 93-111.
Ward, P, Gore, J, Hutton, R, Conway, G & Hoffman,
R 2018, Adaptive skill as the conditio sine qua non of
expertise, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and
Cognition, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 35-50.
Wentzel, K 2019, Students relationships with teachers, in
J Meece & J Eccles (eds), Handbook of research on schools,
schooling and human development, London: Routledge, pp.
93-109.
Young, A, Fry, S 2008, Metacognitive awareness and
academic achievement in college students, Journal of the
Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, vol. 8, no. 2, pp.
1-10.
2019 IFAC HMS
Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 16-19, 2019
168
